RESOLUTION OF THE LIBERTY UNION PARTY

Every member of the Vermont Congressional Delegation is a War Criminal, as defined by the International Criminal Court and United Nations Human Rights Commission Resolution  A/HRC/29/L, due to their respective votes (August 22, 2014) approving $225 million dollars additional military aid to Israel, supporting Israel’s 2014 invasion of Gaza (July 7-August 4).

The 29th Regular Session of United Nations Human Right Commission (June 15-July 3) passed Resolution A/HRC/29/L. 35 “Ensuring accountability and justice for all violations of international law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.” The United States is the only country voting against this resolution which was approved by 41 nations (with 5 other nations abstaining).

Rule 156 of the International Criminal Court defines war crimes as “serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict” and “serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in an armed conflict not of an international character. (ICC Statute, Article 8 , cited in Vol. II, Ch. 44, § 3) 

A deductive analysis of the actual list of war crimes found in various treaties and other international instruments, as well as in national legislation and case-law, shows that violations are in practice treated as serious, and therefore as war crimes, if they endanger protected persons or objects or if they breach important values.

(i) The conduct endangers protected persons or objects. The majority of war crimes involve death, injury, destruction or unlawful taking of property. However, not all acts necessarily have to result in actual damage to persons or objects in order to amount to war crimes. This became evident when the Elements of Crimes for the International Criminal Court were being drafted. It was decided, for example, that it was enough to launch an attack on civilians or civilian objects, even if something unexpectedly prevented the attack from causing death or serious injury. This could be the case of an attack launched against the civilian population or individual civilians, even though, owing to the failure of the weapon system, the intended target was not hit. The same is the case for subjecting a protected person to medical experiments – actual injury is not required for the act to amount to a war crime; it is enough to endanger the life or health of the person through such an act. (See Knut Dörmann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Sources and Commentary,  Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 130 and 233).

(ii) The conduct breaches important values. Acts may amount to war crimes because they breach important values, even without physically endangering persons or objects directly. (See ICC Statute, Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and (e)(vii) 

In the interlocutory appeal in the Tadi? case in 1995, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia stated that “the violation of the rule [of international humanitarian law] must entail, under customary or conventional law, the individual criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule”.

This practice does not exclude the possibility that a State may define under its national law other violations of international humanitarian law as war crimes. The consequences of so doing, however, remain internal and there is no internationalization of the obligation to repress those crimes and no universal jurisdiction.

Earlier practice seems to indicate that a specific act did not necessarily have to be expressly recognized by the international community as a war crime for a court to find that it amounted to a war crime.

Practice provides further specifications with respect to the nature of the conduct constituting a war crime, its perpetrators and their mental state.

(i) Acts or omissions. War crimes can consist of acts or omissions. 

(ii) Perpetrators. Practice in the form of legislation, military manuals and case-law shows that war crimes are violations committed either by members of the armed forces or by civilians against members of the armed forces, civilians or protected objects of the adverse party.

(iii) Mental element. International case-law has indicated that war crimes are violations that are committed wilfully, i.e., either intentionally (dolus directus) or recklessly (dolus eventualis).

Every member of the Vermont Congressional Delegation is a War Criminal, as defined by the International Criminal Court and United Nations Human Rights Commission Resolution  A/HRC/29/L, due to their respective votes (August 22, 2014) approving $225 million dollars additional military aid to Israel, supporting Israel’s 2014 invasion of Gaza (July 7-August 4).

The 29th Regular Session of United Nations Human Right Commission (June 15-July 3) passed Resolution A/HRC/29/L. 35 “Ensuring accountability and justice for all violations of international law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.” The United States is the only country voting against this resolution which was approved by 41 nations (with 5 other nations abstaining).

Rule 156 of the International Criminal Court defines war crimes as “serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict” and “serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in an armed conflict not of an international character. (ICC Statute, Article 8 , cited in Vol. II, Ch. 44, § 3) 

A deductive analysis of the actual list of war crimes found in various treaties and other international instruments, as well as in national legislation and case-law, shows that violations are in practice treated as serious, and therefore as war crimes, if they endanger protected persons or objects or if they breach important values.

(i) The conduct endangers protected persons or objects. The majority of war crimes involve death, injury, destruction or unlawful taking of property. However, not all acts necessarily have to result in actual damage to persons or objects in order to amount to war crimes. This became evident when the Elements of Crimes for the International Criminal Court were being drafted. It was decided, for example, that it was enough to launch an attack on civilians or civilian objects, even if something unexpectedly prevented the attack from causing death or serious injury. This could be the case of an attack launched against the civilian population or individual civilians, even though, owing to the failure of the weapon system, the intended target was not hit. The same is the case for subjecting a protected person to medical experiments – actual injury is not required for the act to amount to a war crime; it is enough to endanger the life or health of the person through such an act. (See Knut Dörmann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Sources and Commentary,  Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 130 and 233).

(ii) The conduct breaches important values. Acts may amount to war crimes because they breach important values, even without physically endangering persons or objects directly. (See ICC Statute, Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and (e)(vii) 

In the interlocutory appeal in the Tadi? case in 1995, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia stated that “the violation of the rule [of international humanitarian law] must entail, under customary or conventional law, the individual criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule”.

This practice does not exclude the possibility that a State may define under its national law other violations of international humanitarian law as war crimes. The consequences of so doing, however, remain internal and there is no internationalization of the obligation to repress those crimes and no universal jurisdiction.

Earlier practice seems to indicate that a specific act did not necessarily have to be expressly recognized by the international community as a war crime for a court to find that it amounted to a war crime.

Practice provides further specifications with respect to the nature of the conduct constituting a war crime, its perpetrators and their mental state.

(i) Acts or omissions. War crimes can consist of acts or omissions. 

(ii) Perpetrators. Practice in the form of legislation, military manuals and case-law shows that war crimes are violations committed either by members of the armed forces or by civilians against members of the armed forces, civilians or protected objects of the adverse party.

(iii) Mental element. International case-law has indicated that war crimes are violations that are committed wilfully, i.e., either intentionally (dolus directus) or recklessly (dolus eventualis).